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TAKING THE OMBUDSMAN CONCEPT
INTO THE PRIVATE SECTOR: NOTES
ON THE BANKING OMBUDSMAN
SCHEME IN NEW ZEALAND
Nadja Tollemache OBE
This paper traces the development of the institution of Ombudsman in New Zealand and
comments on the move of the idea #om the public to the private sector. In the private sector,
developments in New Zealand followed other common law countries. New Zealand appointed
its jirst Banking Ombudsman in July 1992.
New Zealanders pride themselves on some notable examples of social legislation which
have taken the New Zealand legal system to the forefront of progress; for example, the
granting in 1893 of the suffrage to women, and some innovative family property legislation
in the early part of this century. Another such piece of legislation and one that has greatly
influenced the whole range of public administration in New Zealand is the Ombudsman Act
1962, which made New Zealand the first English -speaking, common law, commonwealth
country in the world to adopt a dispute resolution system that originated in Sweden.
The basic idea behind the system is that the individual, who is in a David and Goliath
situation when taking on the immeasurably more powerful public authorities, should be
able to turn to an impartial person who can look at complaints about matters of
administration, can access all the facts, including departmental files and memoranda, and
can decide whether the decision or other act complained of was deficient according to a list
of statutory criteria now set out in section 22 of the Ombudsmen Act 1975.1 Not only
actions and decisions, but also that most difficult form of maladministration, inaction and
delay, are covered.
* Parliamentary Ombudsman 1987-1992; first New Zealand Banking Ombudsman 1992-1995.
1 Parliamentary Commissioner(Ombudsman) Act 1962, now consolidated and amended in the Ombudsmen Act
1975.
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The first test under section 22 is that the act which is the subject matter of the
investigation "appears to have been contrary to law".2 The drafting here is significant; an
Ombudsman does not make pronouncements on the law- that is the function of the courts-
but he or she forms an opinion that something "appears" to be contrary to law. Quite often,
in my experience during my term of office from 1987 to 1992, the unlawfulness consisted of
charging a member of the public for services which the department or other organisation
was legally obliged to provide, without any authority to make such a charge. The newly
formed bodies such as state owned enterprises, but also restructured departments, had to be
reminded firmly of the constitutional principles that applied to them as much as to any other
public body, and that the new general philosophy of "user pays" did not provide them with
statutory authority to make specific charges.3
The test of lawfulness is, then, the first of the criteria. Another is whether the action
was.4
unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory or (and this was the innovative
part) was in accordance with a rule of law or a provision of any Act, regulation, or bylaw or a
practice that is or may be unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory.
It must be remembered that when the Ombudsman Act was passed in 1962, the great
development of administrative law through the courts was yet to come; the term
"unreasonable" has not been interpreted as incorporating any jurisdictional "Wednesbury"
subtleties.5 It meant, and for the Ombudsman's office continued to mean, what ordinary
people would think unacceptable. And "discrimination", which has become the focus for
much discussion since the passing of the race relations and human rights legislation.6 was
2 Ombudsmen Act 1975, s 22(1)(a).
3 See the Report of the Ombudsmen for the year ended 30 June 1992, page 42.
4 Above n 2, s 22(1)(b).
5 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1KB 223 (CA); action for a
declaration that a condition imposed by the local authority was ultra vires and unreasonable. Lord Greene
MR pointed out that a discretion must be exercised reasonably and gave examples of various meanings of
"unreasonable". Of the argument of counsel for the Associated Picture Houses, Lord Greene commented "he is
really saying that the ultimate arbiter of what is and is not reasonable is the court and not the local
authority..... and in the end he agreed that his proposition......really meant that it must be proved to be
unreasonable in the sense that the court considers it to be a decision that no reasonable body could have come
to". He continued "the effect of the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correctness of one
view over another... provided they act, as they have acted,within the four corners of their jurisdiction, this
court, in my opinion, cannot interfere". The Ombudsman's role is very different and is not confined to
jurisdictional unreasonableness but can examine the merits.
6 Race Relations Act 1971, Human Rights Commission Act 1977, New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Human
Rights Act 1993.
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then also uncharted territory. It was a bold step to empower the Ombudsman to not only
test acts of the administration against these criteria, but also to scrutinise the law and
practice on which the acts were based . If the law or practice were found wanting, sections
22(3)(d) and (e) specifically empowered the Ombudsman to recommend reconsideration of
such law or practice, and the Ombudsmen have not been slow over the years to carry out
that mandate. It is, however, clearly an area where diplomacy and common sense are
required since a recommendation impugning the reasonableness of a recently passed and
properly considered piece of legislation would not only not be accepted, but would be
counterproductive. In areas where the Ombudsmen have particular experience or
expertise,7 it would therefore be wiser to point out problems in proposed legislation before
it became law.8
Of the other tests under section 22, the test "whether the action was based wholly or
partly on a mistake of law or fact"9 seems less remarkable now that the Contractual
Mistakes Act 1977 and the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 have accustomed us to remedies
for mistake in areas covered by that legislation. But operative mistake even in contracts
was very limited in 1962. Yet many administrative decisions, both then and now, especially
in the social welfare area, can be made on a mistaken basis and can be particularly
traumatic for someone whose benefit is stopped or cut back; even if the mistake is later
rectified, the effect of a mistaken benefit cancellation can be disproportionately harsh.
The final criterion under section 22, "that the action was wrong"10 is extraordinarily
wide, but there have been few situations where an Ombudsman has had to base a
recommendation exclusively on that ground, and naturally the greatest care is taken to
support the opinion in such a way that any recommendation based on it is sufficiently
persuasive to be accepted.
There is one other basis for action in section 22 which, with the development of
administrative law by the courts and the coverage by later legislation,11 has become
7 This was particularly true of matters relating to the Official Information Act 1983 after the demise under the
"sunset clause" (section 53) of the Information Authority, which had been charged with, inter alia, reviewing
legislative protection of official information and with recommending changes to make information more
accessible and to prevent improper use of personal information; Official Information Act1982, ss 38 and 39.
8 See Reports of the Ombudsmen for the years ending 30 June 1992 (at pages 16 and 49); 1993 (at pages 15, 49)
1994(at page 43).
9 Above n 2, s.22(1)(c).
10 Above n 2, s 22(1)(d).
1 1 Of particular importance has been the right to reasons for decisions under s 23 of the Official Information Act
1982 and s 22 of the Official Information and Meetings Act 1987.
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perhaps less vital but still provides an enormously important statement about
administrative standards. It is that:12
in the making of the decision or recommendation, or in the doing or omission of the act, a
discretionary power has been exercised for an improper purpose or on irrelevant grounds or
on the taking into account of irrelevant considerations, or that...reasons should have been
given for the decision.
I believe there is nothing that concentrates the mind of an official more wonderfully than
to have to give reasons for a decision.
While much more could be said about the basis for action on which Ombudsmen carry
out their functions, the statutory criteria in section 22 have been picked out because they
sum up the aim of the whole exercise: to achieve fairness in administration.
Since 1962 the Ombudsman system of complaints resolution has spread world-wide, and
many countries have taken note in setting up their own schemes of the New Zealand
legislation and experience. While there are variants to suit conditions in different
countries, there are some typical characteristics. Access to the Ombudsman is usually
direct, informal and free of charge. The Ombudsman's procedures are non-adversary and
non-technical and reasons are given for whatever is decided.13 Recourse to the Ombudsman
is only after the respondent department or other organisation has been given the chance to
put its own house in order; in other words, it is a last resort after internal complaints
procedures and appeals have failed to provide a resolution.14 If the Ombudsman does find
after investigation that there has been some maladministration, there is usually a wide
range of possible recoinmendations that would put matters to rights.15
The success of Ombudsmen schemes in the public sector in a wide range of countries, and
particularly their cost-effectiveness as a dispute resolution mechanism, has been such that it
is not surprising that the system has been transferred to the private sector; the issue this
brief paper seeks to raise for consideration is whether the concept of "fairness" has suffered
a sea-change in being transmuted from the public to the private sector. But first, some
background on the transfer of the Ombudsman idea to the private sector must be sketched in.
In this matter New Zealand cannot claim to have led the way. The first private sector
Ombudsman in New Zealand, the Banking Ombudsman, is an office that came into operation
12 Above n 2, s 22(2).
13 Above n 2, ss21 and 22(3)(g)
14 Above n 2, ss13(7)(a) and 17 (1)(a).
15 Above n 2, s 22(3),
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on 1 July 1992 and was closely modelled on similar offices in the United Kingdom and
Australia.
In the United Kingdom the starting point for use of a private sector Ombudsman was
unquestionably the creation in 1981 of the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau. It was the
success of a self regulatory but independent Ombudsman in the insurance industry that gave
the impetus for other commercial sector Ombudsman schemes for banks, building societies,
investment advisors falling under the FIMBRA and IMRO umbrella, and pensions.
The United Kingdom Banking Ombudsman became operational in 1986 and there is little
doubt there was an element of a defensive pre-emptive strike in the setting up of the office:
after the 1986 Financial Services Act the banks were faced with the option of either
reforming their own grievance resolution procedures for customers or the unpalatable
possibility of an imposed, tough, statutory regime.16 Similarly in Australia, where
relationships between banks and customers had fallen to a low ebb, the proposal for an
independent dispute resolution mechanism intermediate between the institutions and the
courts was endorsed by the Treasury and the Trade Practices Commission.17
In New Zealand the setting up of the Banking Ombudsman scheme proceeded along a
slightly different path. The first difference was a matter of sequence of events; in New
Zealand the Code of Banking Practice came into operation before any Ombudsman was
appointed,18 which had a number of effects. First, the Code itself made membership of the
Ombudsman scheme obligatory to those banks that adhered to the Code,19 and there was
therefore no "opting in" after the scheme had commenced as there was in the UK and in
Australia; as a result all the participating banks could be brought in by the Banking
Ombudsman to co-operate in discussions on the best procedures to put in place. Under the
Code, the banks were also obliged to put in place internal complaints procedures. Secondly,
since the Code was already in place, the first Banking Ombudsman was not involved in the
process of drafting it which elsewhere has given rise to considerable debate and which, in
Australia, involved the Ombudsman in a somewhat tense and controversial role. Thirdly, in
the Code the banks set out the minimum standards of good banking practice; if these were
breached there was therefore no room for argument if the Banking Ombudsman found a
16 The Jack Committee suggested that the industry sponsored scheme be supplanted by a statutory one; Banking
Services: Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee Professor RB Jack (Chairman) HMSO Cm 622.
17 Electronic Funds Transfer: Report by the Treasury and Trade Practices Commission on dispute resolution, July
1989.
18 The Code came into effect on 1 March 1992, having been published in January.
19 The Code in Clause 1.1 set out standards to be observed by Member banks of the New Zealand Bankers'
Association; in Clause 21.3 Banks subscribing to the Code were to belong to the Banking Ombudsman scheme
and to have publicly available in all branches details of the scheme.
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complainant's case had been made out, and indeed a majority of early complaints did not
need to be fully investigated since the outcome was clearly predictable and, on reference to
the banks own internal procedures, could be satisfactorily resolved.
The second difference was a matter of structure. Whereas in the United Kingdom and
Australia a tripartite, corporate form for the scheme was chosen, in New Zealand a simpler,
unincorporated form was chosen consisting of the Commission and the Ombudsman's office.
The important thing is that whether a corporate form is chosen or not, it is essential that
there should be a manifestly independent body interposed between the funding member
banks (who will be the "respondents" in any investigations) and the Ombudsman. In New
Zealand this body is the Banking Ombudsman Commission, chaired by a retired Court of
Appeal judge, with two consumer and two banking representatives. It is the Commission's
function to appoint the Banking Ombudsman, to collaborate with Government or any
corporations on matters affecting banking, to consider and approve the budget, to levy,
charge and collect the necessary funding from the participating banks in accordance with
the Rules of the scheme, and to receive and consider recommendations from the Banking
Ombudsman for changes to the Terms of Reference and to recommend to the Council of the
New Zealand Bankers' Association such amendments as the Commission thinks fit.
Clearly it is the strength and credibility of the Commission that guarantees the
independence of the Banking Ombudsman and staff. Accountability of the Banking
Ombudsman is to the Commission and, through the annual report, to the public.
In New Zealand there is also a unique relationship between the Parliamentary
Ombudsman and those in the private sector:20 after a very long wait while the proposal
languished in the limbo of legislative measures that have no potential to produce voter
support, an amendment to the Ombudsmen Act was passed in December 1991 to protect the
use of the name "ombudsman" which essentially gave the Chief Ombudsman control over
who could use the name.21
20 There is now also an Insurance and Savings Ombudsman, whose office commenced operations in 1995;
further, as a result of the Inter-party Accord on Superannuation, the office of Retirement Commissioner was set
up by the Retirement Ombudsman and other persons with similar complaint or dispute handling
responsibilities (refer Section 6 (e) Retirement Income Act 1993) and also to review the kinds of. Whether that
will proceed remains to be seen, but the report has been postponed from the end of 1994 until the first half of
1996.
21 Ombudsmen Act 1975, s28A (1) now provides; "No person, other than an Ombudsman appointed under this
Act, may use the name "Ombudsman" in connection with any business, trade or occupation or the provision of
any service, whether for payment or otherwise, or hold himself, herself or itself out to be an Ombudsman
except pursuant to an Act or with the prior written consent of the Chief Ombudsman".
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The purpose behind seeking this amendment was twofold: first, to prevent the
proliferation of "Ombudsmen" in such situations as internally appointed newspaper and
college Ombudsmen who are little more than complaints advisers with no real independence
and who damage the credibility of Ombudsmen properly so called; second, it presented an
opportunity to set out criteria which would be used by the Chief Ombudsman when
considering applications to use the name.22 Approval for use of the name "Banking
Ombudsman" was granted on 2 April 1992. Between that time and February 1994, when the
Chief Ombudsman approved the use of the term "Insurance and Savings Ombudsman", the
approval requirement enabled the Chief Ombudsman to initiate further discussions with the
insurance industry and consumer organisations which resulted in a single scheme to cover
the insurance industry as a whole, rather than the separate Life Insurance and Fire and
General Insurance Schemes first proposed.23
As for the Banking Ombudsman position in New Zealand, I had the interesting
experience, having just completed my term as Parliamentary Ombudsman, of establishing the
new office in accordance with its Terms of Reference and also the Criteria for approval.
The main objectives of a private sector Ombudsman scheme needed to be considered, as
well as the requirements of the Terms of Reference. The first objective of a private sector
Ombudsman scheme is to resolve disputes in such a way that the sheer inequality of power
between a large, wealthy institution such as a bank, and its customer does not produce a
situation where the customer feels unable to obtain redress. To this end the scheme provides
an informal, speedy and cost-free alternative to the courts.
The second objective is securing a fair outcome. As is also the case with the
Parliamentary Ombudsman, the scheme allows the dispute to be solved on a broader
equitable basis than would be possible in the courts, since the Terms of Reference explicitly
require the Banking Ombudsman, in making any recommendation or award, to do so by
reference to what is, in his or her opinion, fair in all the circumstances.24 Any applicable
rule of law is to be observed, and regard must be had to the general principles of good
22 The criteria were published in the Report of the Ombudsmen for the year ended 30 June 1992. It may be of some
interest that the following year there was formed in the United Kingdom (and later joined by Eire) an
Association of Ombudsmen in the Public and Private sector with criteria for membership very similar to the
New Zealand criteria. In his capacity as President of the International Ombudsmen Institute, the New Zealand
Chief Ombudsman Sir John Robertson addressed the inaugural Conference of the UK Ombudsman Association.
23 See Report of the Ombudsmen for the Year ended 30 June1992 page 37; Report of the Ombudsmen for the
Year ended 30 June 1993 page 44; Report of the Ombudsmen for the year ended 30 June 1994 page 37; Report
of the Chief Ombudsman Sir John Robertson on leaving Office. An application for approval by a local
newspaper for an Editorial Ombudsman was declined as it did not meet No 4 of the criteria which is;
"permission to use the name "Ombudsman" will not normally be granted for unique local or regional rules".
24 Terms of Reference Paragraph 16.
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banking practice and any relevant code of practice.25 The Banking Ombudsman is not
bound by any previous decisions, an important point, since it removes the argument a bank
might otherwise put up that it cannot make allowances for this particular customer as it
would otherwise be stuck with a precedent.
The third objective is that the scheme not only functions as an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism, but can go beyond the case-by-case approach of the courts and bring
about changes to practice. In other words, it can work as a systematic audit. To this end
the Banking Ombudsman is empowered to make recommendations to the Chairman of the
Banking Ombudsman Commission from time to time in relation to the Terms of Reference or
any relevant Codes of Practice which have a bearing on the discharge of his or her
responsibilities.26
The key aim in relation to each objective is fairness. However good a legal system may be
(and in a rapidly changing world where electronic banking is displacing older techniques
such as cheques it is hard for the legislation to keep up with the needs of the commercial
community), when an individual faces a powerful corporation across a courtroom, the
imbalance in resources not only is likely to make the specific contest unfair, but fear of such
a scenario may scare off many others who have a worthwhile case from bringing the issue
to court. So fairness here demands a "level playing field". Part and parcel of that is building
in protections into the rules that govern the relationship between the parties. This is where
the Code of Banking Practice comes in, which sets out some customers' rights which in the
past have not always been observed.27 Since the Code and the Scheme came into operation
in 1992, the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 from which banks, inter alia, unsuccessfully
sought exemption, has come into effect and given a number of protections beyond those set
out in the Code.28
The second aspect of fairness is in the process of dealing with disputes. This means
allowing both sides to put their case, but it goes much further since the complainant is often
unaware of information about the dispute that is necessary or could help his or her case.
The Banking Ombudsman needs to look at a range of conduct, contracts and statements from
each side. The Terms of Reference make it clear that in gathering such information the
Banking Ombudsman is not bound by legal rules of evidence, though the parties are
25 Above n 24, Paragraph 16 (a) and (b).
26 Above n 24, Paragraph 33.
27 See Code of Banking Practice Clauses 2, 4, 2.6, 5.3.1, 10.5.1. The Code is at present in the process of being
reviewed and submissions have been made on the proposed new Code.
28 The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 came into force on 1 April 1994. In Section 2(1) the definition of "services"
specifically includes in (c) a contract between a bank and a customer of the bank.
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protected by the reasons that must be given for any decision, which would need to refer to
evidence on which those reasons are based .This is one area where the difference between a
Parliamentary Ombudsman and an Ombudsman under a voluntary scheme is starkly
obvious. The legislation gives the Parliamentary Ombudsman very wide statutory powers
to obtain information from any person, and to put those with relevant information on
oath,29 and provides any witnesses with protection and a defence even to what would
otherwise be breach of secrecy provisions in other legislation. On the other hand the
Terms of Reference, while they provide that tte Banking Ombudsman may require the
defendant bank to provide any information relating to that complaint which is, or is alleged
to be, in its possession,30 and that the bank shall as soon as reasonably practicable disclose
it to the Banking Ombudsman, represent simply a contractual undertaking to the Commission
and are unenforceable by the Banking Ombudz,man except through the influence of the
Commission. The problem is even greater since 1 he Terms of Reference themselves provide
an exemption by which the Bank can certify that the disclosure of the information would
place the bank in breach of its duty of confidentiality to a third party whose consent it had
used its best endeavours to obtain. These assert ions would be impossible for the Banking
Ombudsman to verify, and the situation becomes even more difficult when one bank has
attempted to claim the right to decide which of the information it holds is "information
relating to the complaint". Since the Terms of Reference clearly state that it is for the
Banking Ombudsman to decide whether or not a complaint falls within jurisdiction, such a
claim to decide whether information "relates " to the claim would be able to undermine an
investigation and must be untenable. It has to be emphasised that in most cases there is no
problem with obtaining the full file, but there is a big difference between having full
statutory powers, backed up by sanctions on the one hand, and relying on the respondent
bank to honour its commitment on the other. Since the commencement of the Scheme in 1992
the Privacy Act 1993 has come into effect, and while at first this was perceived by some as
another possible obstacle to satisfactory access to full information, it has now been
accepted that the Banking Ombudsman can act as agent for the complainant to obtain all the
information accessible under the Act, which would also permit enforcement via the Privacy
Commissioner's Office. That new regime does not, of course assist where the complainant is
a company since the Privacy Act only covers perscinal information about "an individual".31
29 Above n 2, s 19.
30 Terms of Reference Paragraph 5.
3 1 Privacy Act 1993, Long Title and s2 definition of "individual" as a natural person, other than a deceased
natural person.
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Another perceived difficulty in ensuring fairness of process is the "Test Case"
provision.32
While this has never yet been used in New Zealand, it enables the bank, at any time
before the Banking Ombudsman has made an Award, to give a notice in writing containing a
statement, with reasons, that in the opinion of the bank the complaint involves or may
involve an issue which may have important consequences for the business of the
participating bank or banks generally or an important or novel point of law. The bank
provides an undertaking that if, within six months of the Banking Ombudsman's receipt of
the notice, either the complainant or the bank institutes proceedings in any Court in New
Zealand in respect of the complaint, the bank will pay the complainant's costs and
disbursements on a solicitor/client basis and make interim payments on account if it
appears reasonable to the bank to do so. Providing the Banking Ombudsman concurs with
the bank's statement, the investigation must then be discontinued.
In spite of criticism that has been aimed at this provision (and similar ones in the UK
and Australia), since the Banking Ombudsman's concurrence is required it is doubtful that
this provision could be abused, particularly as the Terms of Reference in any case provide
that if, at any time, it appears to the Banking Ombudsman that the complaint would be more
appropriately dealt with by a court, the Banking Ombudsman can relinquish jurisdiction.33
So, how does "fairness" under a voluntary private sector Scheme compare with
"fairness" in the public sector?
In both cases what Ombudsmen do is, like Chancellors in the Middle Ages, to supplement
and ameliorate the law applied by the courts and to provide alternative procedures not
available in the courts. The courts of today, on the basis of much new legislation that has
enhanced the civil and consumer rights of the public, can do much more than formerly to
ensure fairness in administration and commerce, and the standards set by the courts are
carefully noted by Ombudsmen. At the end of the day, however, courts are setting
32 Terms of Reference Paragraph 23.
33 The drafting is curious. Under the heading "Limits on the Banking Ombudsman's Powers" Paragraph 18
provides:
The Banking Ombudsman shall have power to consider a complaint made to him or her except:
(d) if at any time it appears to the banking Ombudsman that it is more appropriate that the complaint be dealt
with by a court, under another independent or statutory complaints or conciliation procedure or under an
arbitration procedure;
(e) if any Participating Bank named in the complaint gives the Banking Ombudsman a notice of the kind
described in paragraph 23.
What is in fact a discretion not to investigate or to discontinue an investigation not unlike the provision in
Section 17(1)(a) of the Ombudsman Act 1975 is here made a jurisdictional limitation.
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precedents about liability and that is why Ombudsmen, because they have a freer hand
under their legislation or terms of reference, can more easily tailor a fair remedy to the
specific case.
There are still important differences betpreen public sector and private sector
Ombudsman jurisdiction: whereas in the public sector any matter of administration
involving listed organisations can be investigated un complaint or on the Ombudsman's own
motion, in the private sector only those matters sliecified in the Terms of Reference can be
looked at and there is no "own motion" jurisd iction. So, in the case of the Banking
Ombudsman Scheme there are a number of limita tions; the claim cannot be above $100,000,
the act or omission complained of must have occiirred after 1 January 1992 (or six months
earlier, and not have been reasonably discoverable until after 1 January 1992), and there is
no jurisdiction to consider a complaint that relates to a commercial judgment in decisions
about lending or security, or interest rate policies or a practice or policy of a bank which
does not itself give rise to a breach of any oblig,ation or duty owed by the bank to the
complainant. Within those limitations, the Banking Ombudsman can investigate, try to get a
resolution, and failing that may make a recommendation as to how the matter should be
settled. If the complainant accepts the recommendation but the bank does not, a binding
award can be made against the bank.
The binding award is an important difference; the outcome of a Parliamentary
Ombudsman investigation is a recommendation and, if the respondent organisation does not
accept it, a report to the Prime Minister and thence to Parliament. That last step has only
had to be resorted to in extremely rare circumstancies. In the case of a complaint relating to a
local authority, where a recommendation is not accepted,the Ombudsman may send a copy of
the report to the Mayor or Chairman of the organisation and may require it to publish, at its
own expense, a summary of the report.
Fairness is a two way process, the Ombudsman must be fair to both the complainant and
the defendant in process, on the merits, and in the outcome. Fairness is a constantly
developing concept and as the public's concerns about commercial or civic powerlessness
and downstream effects of information technology are reflected in new legislation such as
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Human Rights Act 1993, the Privacy Act 1993
and the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 or in judicial decisions, the relevant Ombudsman
can revise upwards the standard of fairness to be a pplied . However Ombudsmen have to
remember that there is no such thing as a free lunch, and in the private sector measures that
may be fair to one person may increase the costs of a service to such an extent that it will
disadvantage and so be potentially unfair to many others. So it is important to keep some
balance in what is decided in respect of an individual complainant; it would be
counterproductive if doing what seemed fair for onc put unreasonable burdens on the many.
Perhaps one main thing that is lacking in the pre:;ent Terms of Reference of the Banking
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Ombudsman Scheme is a requirement, when considering what is good practice, to consult
with consumer representatives as well as with the banks. When the time comes to evaluate
how the Scheme has operated since its inception that change to the Terms of Reference may
be worth considering.
L'experience neo-zilandaise de l'application des rigles relatives & l'institution
de l'Ombudsman dans le secteur privE
Les Ndo Zdlandais sont fiers des nombreuses avancdes sociales que l'on doit h leur
syst@me 16gal. Il suffira de faire r@f@rence au droit de vote octroy@ au femmes des 1893, et
quelques dispositions uniques en leur genre dans le domaine du droit de la famille. Il faut
6galement mentionner l'Ombudsman Act de 1962 compldti par l'On*udsmen Act de 1975,
qui tous deux ont fagonnd de nouveaux rapports entre le citoyen et l'administration Ndo
Z@landaise. Inspird du systeme suddois, l'id@e principale qui soutend cette institution repose
d'une part sur la prise de conscience du d6sdquilibre des forces qui existent entre
l'administration et les administrds et d'autre part sur la ndcessit6 qu'il y a pour ces
derniers, de pouvoir compter sur les services d'une personne impartiale dans le cadre de
litiges qui pourraient naitre entre eux.
La section 22 du Ombudsmen Act de 1975 pose comme principe que la d6cision
administrative sournise au contr6le de l'Ombudsman doit "apparaitre comme contraire h la
loi". Sans empidter sur le domaine r@serv6 des tribunaux, les d6cisions de l'Ombudsman se
pr@sentent comme des avis sur la lagalitt de telle ou telle decision administrative. Au del& du
premier crit&re de l'i116galit6 apparente, les agissements de l'administration seront
susceptibles d'etre ddfdrds h la censure de l'Ombudsman chaque fois qu'il est ddraisonnable
(c'est h dire ce qu'un citoyen ordinaire le considire comme inacceptable), injuste ou
discriminatoire au regard des textes en vigueur. Sur ce fondement, le contr6le de
l'Ombudsman a pu etre dendu aux textes qui sont les supports de l'acte administratif
incrimind. De la mdrn@ mani&re chaque Mis que le comportement de l'administration repose
sur une interpr@tation de la loi totalement ou partiellement fausse, l'Ombudsman se verra
reconnaitre comp@tence. Un dernier fondement est propos@ par la section 22 du Ombudsmen
Act de 1975, et c'est sans aucun doute le plus vague, puisqu'il autorise une intervention
lorsque l'action de l'administration est "erronee". Enfin, grace a l'intervention des
tribunaux, alli@e A quelques dispositions 16gislatives sp@cifiques, le contrale de la
motivation des actes administratifs entre aujourd'hui dans le champ de competence de
l'Ombudsrnan.
Le succas de l'institution a 6td tel qu'il n'est gutre surprenant qu'elle ait dt@ Stendue au
secteur priv6. L'objectif poursuivi atait h l'instar des 16gislations pr@c@dentes de
promouvoir un 6quilibre des forces entre les consommateurs et les grands groupes
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industriels et financiers. Sans rdellement s'inspirer du mod*le anglais, mis en place en 1986,
le secteur bancaire fut le premier en Nouvelle Zdlande & connaitre en 1992 le recours A
l'Ombudsman.
Un organisme a 6td cr66 entre les institutions bancaires et l'Ombudsman bancaire,
l'Ombudsman Banking Commission pr6si(ide par un haut magistrat de l'ordre judiciaire et
composd de deux reprdsentants des associations de consommateurs et de deux repr6sentants
des organismes financiers. Il appartient h cette cominission de nommer l'Ombudsman, tout en
remplissant une fonction de conseil tant aupr&s du gouvernement que des institutions
bancaires.
La premi&re tache de l'Ombudsman dans le secteur privd est de rendre une decision
dquitable. Pour ce faire il est affranchi des traditionnelles r*gles en matiere de preuves de
telle sorte que sa marge de manoeuvre apparait bien plus grande que n'importe quel tribunal
et qu'il agit comme un v6ritable audit de l'ensemble de l'institution bancaire. La 16gislation
donne h l' Ombudsman des pouvoirs extr@mement #tendus tant dans la recherche des preuves
et 616ments d'informations matdrielles que pour l'audition de t6moins.
Sur le plan pratique cette recherche se heurte n6anmoins au secret bancaire et A la
possibilit6 pour les banques de mettre un terme h la procddure en indemnisant le
consommateur plaignant, privant ainsi l'Ombudsman de la possibilitd de mener A terme ses
investigations. Il reste toutefois que la pratique du recours h l'Ombudsman dans le secteur
privd offre au consommateur une possibilit6 de I&glement extra judiciaire des litiges qui
l'oppose au secteur priva A commencer par le sectezir bancaire.
